Random beacons-information sources that broadcast a stream of random digits unknown by anyone beforehand-are useful for various cryptographic purposes. But such beacons can be easily and undetectably sabotaged, so that their output is known beforehand by a dishonest party, who can use this information to defeat the cryptographic protocols supposedly protected by the beacon. We explore a strategy to reduce this hazard by combining the outputs from several noninteracting (eg spacelike-separated) beacons by XORing them together to produce a single digit stream which is more trustworthy than any individual beacon, being random and unpredictable if at least one of the contributing beacons is honest. If the contributing beacons are not spacelike separated, so that a dishonest beacon can overhear and adapt to earlier outputs of other beacons, the beacons' trustworthiness can still be enhanced to a lesser extent by a time sharing strategy. We point out some disadvantages of alternative trust amplification methods based on one-way hash functions.
In cryptography and distributed computing, a random beacon is a trusted information source (eg a radio transmitter) that periodically broadcasts a random signal which is unknown to anyone before the time of broadcast but becomes known to everyone thereafter. Beacons were originally proposed by Rabin [1] to facilitate remote transactions such as contract signing. Bennett, DiVincenzo and Linsker [2] (cf. Fig. 1 ) proposed using a trusted random beacon to help authenticate video recordings, made by untrusted recording apparatus operated by untrusted personnel, against falsification of the time or content (see Figure 1 ). These two applications require only a low information rate (eg kHz), and assume that the history of previously emitted signals becomes a matter of public record, being stored at the beacon and/or other independent locations to help resolve disputes. More recently, Aumann and Rabin [3] have proposed using a much higher bandwidth beacon (eg GHz to THz) to permit informationally secure encryption. The security of this scheme depends on the beacon's information rate being so great that no one can feasibly store the history of its previously emitted signals.
The Achilles' heel of beacons is the need for users to trust that they have not been sabotaged. A dishonest beacon operator can intentionally substitute pseudorandom digits, or true random digits generated much earlier and leaked to accomplices, for the supposedly fresh random digits being emitted by the beacon. Even if the operator is honest, a dishonest hardware supplier could have concealed a tiny clandestine pseudorandom generator (PSRG) in the supposed true random generator (TRG) hardware used by the beacon, causing the hardware's output to be largely predictable. To avoid detection, such a hardware saboteur should not make the output wholly deterministic, because this would lead to the sabotaged generator issuing the same digit stream
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FIG. 1. Time-bracketed video authentication uses periodic "challenge" signals from a trusted random source to influence the scene being recorded (e.g. by a challenge-controlled laser scan), and shortly thereafter returns a hashed digest of the scene, including the effect of the challenge, to a trusted repository. The digests are produced by applying a secure hash function h to the current digital image data). The time bracketing prevents pre-or post-dating, and provides evidence that the action actually took place, as opposed to having been computationally simulated in real time or assembled from prerecorded material. Dishonest personnel can destroy the videotape, or can prevent it from being recorded in the first place, but so long as the beacon and repository remain honest, they cannot easily produce a faked video that will match the archived digests.
every time it was turned on. Rather the sabotaged generator might take its first few hundred digits from the TRG, then use these as a seed for the concealed PSRG to generate the rest of the sequence deterministically. An accomplice, knowing the nature of the sabotage, could then monitor the first few hundred digits of beacon output and use these to predict all the rest. To help accomplices who had missed the initial beacon output, the saboteur could use a steganographic reseeding strategy, for example whenever a particular random 40-bit string appeared in the beacon output, it would signal that the next 200 bits were not pseudorandom, but true random bits being used to reseed the concealed PSRG.
One might hope that these various sabotages, at least the ones involving pseudorandom generators, could be detected by post-facto analysis of the corrupted digit stream; but this hope is probably vain, as it is widely believed that there exist "cryptographically strong" pseudorandom generators which, when seeded with a random n-bit seed, produce an output stream that cannot be distinguished from true random digits in time polynomial in n.
In view of the ease of sabotaging beacons and the difficulty of detecting that they have been sabotaged, the main hope for beacon users would appear to lie in protocols that amplify trust by combining the outputs of several spatially and administratively separated beacons, in the reasonable expectation that they only a few of them have been sabotaged. Henceforth we will consider a set of n nominally but not exactly synchronized beacons B 1 ...B n , each of which emits digits from an ℓ letter alphabet at regular intervals. Some beacons are are honest and some dishonest (sabotaged), and we assume that the dishonest subset does not change with time. We will consider protocols for trust amplification by users who have access to the outputs of all the beacons.
An important consideration is whether the user, who combines the output of several beacons to produce some resultant sequence, is honest or dishonest. These two premises are profoundly different, and give rise to quite different protocols. An honest user strives to produce a resultant sequence that is random and unpredictable by accomplices of the dishonest beacons, despite not knowing which these are. A dishonest user, by contrast, knows the identities of the dishonest beacons, and conspires with them to produce a predictable resultant sequence, despite the unpredictability of the outputs of the honest beacons. A dishonest-user protocol is considered successful if it defeats this conspiracy, forcing the resultant sequence to be unpredictable even though the dishonest user is trying to make it predictable. This is the relevant premise for time-bracketed video authentication, whose goal is to prevent a potentially dishonest camera manufacturer and operator from producing a video that has been undetectably falsified as to its time or content.
One might ask why an honest user needs any beacon at all: if he is assumed to be honest, why can't he generate his own random numbers, in effect being a beacon unto himself? One possible answer is that he may lack the physical capacity to produce random numbers, or to produce them as fast as he desires, without drawing on external sources of randomness. In passing we note that an honest user, having a low-rate random source in his own lab, can use an extractor (cf. [5] , to distill certifiably unpredictable high-rate random numbers from the lowrate private source and a collection of high-rate random beacons, only some of which are honest.
The remainder of this paper will concern dishonestuser protocols of the kind relevant for beacons to be used in time-bracketed authentication.
Vazirani [4] considered the related problem of devising protocols to extract nearly unbiased random bits from two beacons, both dishonest and colluding, but neither entirely controllable by its operator. Here, by contrast, we have some beacons that are entirely controllable by colluding dishonest operators, and others that are entirely random and honest, but the designer of the protocol doesn't know which.
B. Trust amplification for beacons that are spacelike separated or otherwise known to be incapable of influencing one another
Trust amplification works best when the beacons are known to be incapable of influencing one another, so the dishonest beacons cannot adapt their output to that of the honest ones. This will be assured if the beacons' emissions are so well synchronized, compared to the distance between them, as to be spacelike separated in the sense of special relativity. Two beacons, say B 1 and B 2 , are said to be spacelike separated when for all integer i the spacetime event E(i, B 1 ) occurs at a spacelike interval from the spacetime event E(i, B 2 ); in other words, a light signal starting at beacon B 1 at the instant when it emits its i ′ th digit B 1 (i) will not have arrived at beacon B 2 by the time beacon B 2 emits its i'th digit B 2 (i), and similarly with the indices 2 and 1 reversed. Under these conditions, it is evident that the XOR (or more generally the mod-ℓ sum ⊕, for an ℓ-letter alphabet) of the two beacons, ie the digit stream B 1 (i) ⊕ B 2 (i), will be random iff at least one of constituent beacons is random. * For a beacon to be trustworthy, its output must not only be random, but also unpredictable before the time it is supposed to become public. In general the information from any given beacon does not become available to everyone simultaneously, owing to propagation delays, which can never be less than the distance of the observer from the beacon divided by the velocity of light c. For example, in the case of two synchronized honest beacons separated by distance d, an observer midway between the beacons would learn B 1 (i) and B 2 (i), and could compute R XOR (i), at a time d/2v after the emission time of the i'th digit, where v ≤ c is the signal propagation velocity. An observer at either beacon would have to wait a little longer, until time d/v, to obtain the signal from the other beacon. These considerations may be summarized in the following proposition, whose proof is obvious:
If B 1 ...B n is a set of spacelike separated beacons, at least one of which is honest, 1. the modular sum
is random, 2. R XOR (i) is unpredictable from the viewpoint of any observer outside the intersection of the forward light cones of the honest subset of beacons.
3. assuming that signals propagate at light speed, R XOR (i) can be correctly calculated by any observer inside the intersection of the forward light cones of all the beacons.
The principal effect of dishonesty is thus to create a region of spacetime within which R XOR (i) is predictable to accomplices of the dishonest beacons, but not to the general public. This region consists of points within the forward light cone of every honest beacon, but outside the forward light cone of at least one dishonest beacon.
C. Trust amplification for beacons that are timelike separated or otherwise suspected of influencing one another
Within any nominally synchronized set of beacons there may be enough timing error that the beacons are not in fact spacelike separated. Lack of spacelike separation can seriously impair the trustworthiness of the resultant sequence R XOR (i), making it untrustworthy over all spacetime, not just in a limited region. For example, suppose that beacon B 1 is so late that it has all the other beacons in its past light cone. Then, if B 1 is sabotaged, it can adapt its output B 1 (i) so as to force the resultant R XOR (i) not to be random, but to take on a predetermined value, perhaps chosen long beforehand. Thus the accomplices of the dishonest beacon potentially know R XOR (i) wherever they sit in spacetime, while honest players, as before, will only know R XOR (i) if they sit within the intersection of the future light cones of all the beacons, which in this case is simply the future light cone of B 1 .
In the worst case, where one beacon is consistently so late as to have all the others in its past light cone, the XOR of all the beacons is no more trustworthy than the single latest beacon taken by itself. However, one can still gain some increased trust by combining the beacons in a different fashion, which we call the time-sharing protocol. Here the resultant is defined to be a cyclicly chosen one of the original beacons,
If some of the beacons are honest and some dishonest, then some digits of the resultant sequence R T S will be predictable by accomplices of the dishonest beacons and others will be unpredictable. The resultant sequence is thus sure to be partly unpredictable, while the sequence from any individual beacon, or the XOR of all of them, has some chance of being wholly predictable. For purposes such as time-bracketed authentication [2] , a sequence that is sure to be at least partly unpredictable is still usable, though not as good as a wholly unpredictable sequence; but a sequence that has some chance of being be wholly predictable is unusable.
The sort of uncertain unpredictability relevant to timebracketed authentication can be quantified by the percharacter min entropy, ie the logarithm of the probability (as seen by the dishonest users) of the most likely resultant sequence R T S (i), divided by the length of the sequence. If there are n timelike separated beacons, k of which at random are sabotaged but we don't know which, then the min entropy of R T S is ((n − k)/n) log ℓ bits per character. On the other hand, each individual beacon, say B 1 , or the XOR of all the beacons if B 1 is the latest, has a per-character min entropy approaching zero, because B 1 's min entropy is dominated by the probability k/n that it is sabotaged, and so emits a sequence that is completely predictable by dishonest users.
The advantage of using min entropy can be seen by noting that in this situation the ordinary Shannon entropies of R T S and B 1 are equal, both being ((n−k)/n) log ℓ bits per character. Thus min entropy heavily and properly penalizes any chance of complete predictability, while Shannon entropy allows it to hide amidst the unpredictability of other cases.
The superiority of spacelike separation, and the advantage of using the R XOR instead of R T S when the beacons are known to be spacelike separated, can be seen by comparing the per character min entropies in various cases.
beacon separation spacelike timelike XOR protocol 1 0 Time sharing protocol (n−k)/n (n−k)/n Table I . Per character min entropy of resultant sequences RXOR and RT S obtained respectively by XOR and timesharing protocols for trust amplification. We assume n beacons, an unknown k of which are dishonest. Entropies are in units of log ℓ, the entropy of an honest beacon emitting characters from an ℓ-letter alphabet.
In general the resultant sequences R XOR (for spacelike separated beacons) or R T S (for any set of beacons) will be at least partly unpredictable, and therefore usable for purposes such as time bracketed authentication, except when all the beacons are dishonest.
